Businesses spend billions of dollars annually on software and hardware to block external cyberattacks, but a shocking number of these same organizations shoot themselves in the foot by poking gaping holes in their digital defenses and then advertising those vulnerabilities to attackers. Today’s post examines an underground service that rents access to hacked PCs at organizations that make this all-too-common mistake.
Makost[dot]net is a service advertised on cybercrime forums which sells access to “RDPs”, mainly Microsoft Windows systems that have been configured (poorly) to accept “Remote Desktop Protocol” connections from the Internet. Windows ships with its own RDP interface built-in; to connect to another Windows desktop or server remotely, simply fire up the Remote Desktop Connection utility in Windows, type in the Internet address of the remote system, and enter the correct username and password for a valid user account on that remote system. Once the connection is made, you’ll see the remote computer’s desktop as if you were sitting right in front of it, and have access to all its programs and files.
Makhost[dot]net sells access to thousands of hacked RDP installations. Prices range from $3 to $10 based on a variety of qualities, such as the number of CPUs, the operating system version and the PC’s upload and download speeds.
Makost currently is selling access to more than 6,000 compromised RDP installations worldwide. As we can see from the screen shot above, hacked systems are priced according to a combination of qualities of the server:
city, state, country of host;
administrative or regular user rights;
operating system version;
number and speed of computer processors;
amount of system memory;
network download and upload speeds;
NAT or direct
KrebsOnSecurity was given a glimpse inside the account of a very active user of this service, an individual who has paid more than $2,000 over the past six months to purchase some 425 hacked RDPs. I took the Internet addresses in this customer’s purchase history and ran WHOIS database lookups on them all in a bid to learn more about the victim organizations. As expected, roughly three-quarters of those addresses told me nothing about the victims; the addresses were assigned to residential or commercial Internet service providers.
But the WHOIS records turned up the names of businesses for approximately 25 percent of the addresses I looked up. The largest group of organizations on this list were in the manufacturing (21 victims) and retail services (20) industries. As I sought to categorize the long tail of other victim organizations, I was reminded of the Twelve Days of Christmas carol.
twelve healthcare providers;
ten education providers;
eight government agencies;
seven technology firms;
six insurance companies;
five law firms;
four financial institutions;
two real estate firms;
and a forestry company (in a pear tree?)
How did these companies end up for sale on makost[dot]net? That is explained deftly in a report produced earlier this year by Trustwave, a company which frequently gets called in when companies experience a data breach that exposes credit card information. Trustwave looked at all of the breaches it responded to in 2012 and found — just as in years past — “IP remote access remained the most widely used method of infiltration in 2012. Unfortunately for victim organizations, the front door is still open.”
The report continues:
“Organizations that use third-party support typically use remote access applications like Terminal Services (termserv) or Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), pcAnywhere, Virtual Network Client (VNC), LogMeIn or Remote Administrator to access their customers’ systems. If these utilities are left enabled, attackers can access them as though they are legitimate system administrators.”
Source: Trustwave 2013 Global Security Report
“Would-be attackers simply scan blocks of Internet addresses looking for hosts that respond to queries on one of these ports. Once they have a focused target list of Internet addresses with open remote administration ports, they can move on to the next part of the attack: The number 2 most-exploited weakness: deafult/weak credentials.”
In case the point wasn’t clear enough yet, I’ve gathered all of the username and password pairs picked by all 430 RDP-enabled systems that were sold to this miscreant. As evidenced by the list below, the attackers simply needed to scan the Internet for hosts listening on port 3389 (Microsoft RDP), identify valid usernames, and then try the same username as the password. In each of the following cases, the username and password are the same.
Some of these credential pairs even give you an idea of the type of organization involved, the employee account that was compromised (“intern,” “techsupport,”); the purpose of the hacked system (“payroll”, “fax,” “scanner,” “timeclock”); even the geographic location of the compromised PC within the organization (e.g., “front desk,” “conference room,” “garage”). Incredibly, some of the systems appear to be named after actual security features or backup devices (“symantec,” “sonicwall,” “sophos”):
If you’ve read this far, I hope it’s clear by now that the easiest way to get your systems hacked using RDP is to pick crappy credentials. Unfortunately, far too many organizations that end up for sale on services like this one are there because they outsourced their tech support to some third-party company that engages in this sort of sloppy security. Fortunately, a quick external port scan of your organization’s Internet address ranges should tell you if any RDP-equipped systems are enabled. Here are a few more tips on locking down RDP installations.
Readers who liked this story may also enjoy this piece — Service Sells Access to Fortune 500 Firms — which examined a similar service for selling hacked RDP systems.
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